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DISCHARGING THE INACTIVE RESERVIST FOR POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES AFFECTING HIS SECURITY STATUS*
T E Army's recent assertion of a right to issue an Undesirable Discharge
to an inactive reservist ' for activities engaged in after release from active
duty presents a new facet of the problem of military authority over persons
not full-time soldiers. Today, after a man is separated from active duty, lie
is ordinarily assigned to the reserves to complete his total military obligation.'-'
Three reserve categories are connected with each armed force--Ready, Stand-
by, and Retired.3 In that order, reservists may be involuntarily recalled to
active duty when Congress declares a war or national emergency ;4 Ready
Reservists may also be called to arms by executive declaration of a national
*Olenick v. Brucker, 173 F. Supp. 493 (D.D.C. 1959), reild and remanded, No. 15177,
D.C. Cir., Dec. 3, 1959.
1. This Note will use the term "inactive reservist" to denote a member of any military
reserve category who is not on active duty, does not draw substantial pay from the mili-
tary, is not required to, and in fact does not, participate in weekly drills or annual train-
ing exercises.
2. About sixty different ways exist for a man to fulfill his military obligation. GRAHAM,
THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY OLIGA IoN 5 (1958). The typical pattern for draftees under
the Universal Military Training and Service Act was two years active duty and six years
in the reserves. 62 Stat. 607 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. 454(d) (3) (1952), as
amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 454(d) (3) (Supp. V, 1958), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. Am.
§§ 454(b), (d) (3) (Supp. 1958). Under the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, the draftee re-
mained liable for two years active duty, ibid., but his total obligation was cut to six years,
see 10 U.S.C. § 651 (1958). At the successful completion of his active duty, the service-
man is generally issued a "Report of Separation from the Armed Forces of the United
States," a wallet-size "Certificate of Service" which characterizes his active service, and
an "Identification and Privilege Card" which terminates privileges incident to active duty.
See Jones, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts To Review the Character of Military Ad-
ininistrative Discharges, 57 CoLuLI. L. REv. 917, 918 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Jones].
3. 10 U.S.C. § 267 (1958). Under current statutes, a person released from active duty
is normally transferred to the Ready Reserve of his armed force. 10 U.S.C. § 269(a)
(1958). After a number of years determined by his particular military option, he may, if
he requests, be transferred to the Standby Reserve for the balance of his military obliga-
tion. 10 U.S.C. § 269(e) (4) (1958). If a person has served a minimum of five years active
duty, he may enter the Standby Reserve directly. 10 U.S.C. § 269(c) (1) (1958). Persons
otherwise qualified who wish to retain their status as reservists may, upon their request,
be transferred to the Retired Reserve. See 10 U.S.C. § 274 (1958). Reservists at least sixty
years old who have completed twenty years of service and have complied with other con-
ditions are eligible for retirement pay. See 10 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958). The evolution of the
reserve categories is traced in Hearings on Reserve Components Pursuant to H.R. 4860
Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1.951) [hereinafter cited as 1951 Hearings]. For a concise outline of the development of
the reserve concept in America, see Galloway, History of United States Military Policy
on Reserve Forces, 1775-1957, H.R. Doc. No. 17, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) [hereinafter
cited as Galloway].
4. 10 U.S.C. §§ 672-75 (1958).
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emergency. 5 Those Ready Reservists who entered the service after August
1955 are required by statute, unless specifically provided otherwise by Ex-
ecutive regulation, to be "active"--either to participate regularly in forty-eight
scheduled drills (or training periods) each year and not more than seventeen
days annual active-duty training or to serve not more than thirty days annual
active-duty training.0 Ready Reservists who entered the armed forces before
1955 may remain "inactive" unless specifically ordered to train by military
authority; 7 no Standby or Retired Reservist has a training obligation.8 A
reservist is ordinarily discharged at the completion of his total military
obligation.9 Discharge terminates his relationship with the armed forces and
is a "formal and final judgment passed by the government" on the quality
of his military performance.1 0 This performance is characterized by one of
five types of discharge: Honorable, General (under honorable conditions),
Undesirable (or, for officers, "under other than honorable conditions"), Bad
Conduct (not issued to officers), and Dishonorable (officers are "dis-
missed"), i z Bad Conduct and Dishonorable Discharges may be issued only
after trial by a court-martial; Honorable, General, and Undesirable Dis-
charges are issued administratively pursuant to service regulations.'
5. 10 U.S.C. § 273 (1958).
6. 10 U.S.C. §§ 270(a) (1), (2) (1958); see Dep't of Defense Directive 1215.6, paras.
IV (B), VII (A) (1) (March 5, 1956). Problems involving the status of active reservists
are outside the scope of this Note.
7. See Armed Forces Reserve Act, ch. 608, § 233(c), 66 Stat. 490 (1952). Only 700,O00
of the 2,200,000 pre-1955 Ready Reservists not on active duty participated in paid training
programs. Galloway 478; see Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1215.6, para. VII(C) (March
5, 1956).
8. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 672, 674-75 (1958); Armed Forces Reserve Act, ch. 603, §§
207(c), 233(c), 66 Stat. 483, 490 (1952). See also Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1215.6,
para. IV (F) (Mlarch 5, 1956).
9. 10 U.S.C. § 3811(a) (1958) (Army). A reservist may be discharged prior to the
completion of his obligated military service under regulations prescribed by the secretary
concerned, or, if he is commissioned, at the pleasure of the President. 10 U.S.C. § 1162(a)
(1958).
10. E.g., United States v. Kelly, 82 U.S. (15 WalL) 34, 36 (1872) ; In re Fong Chew
Chung, 149 F.2d 904, 906 (9th Cir. 1945).
11. See, e.g., Army Reg. 635-200, § II, para. 5 (April 8, 1959) (issued pursuant to 10
U.S.C. § 381.1(b) (1958)) [Army Regulations are hereinafter cited as AR]. While these
types are standard today, the categories have varied in the past. See, e.g., United States
v. Kingsley, 138 U.S. 87 (1891) ("discharge . . .as unfit for service, character bad") ;
Davis v. Woodring, 111 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ("discharge from draft"); Reid v.
United States, 161 Fed. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), writ of error disfnissed, 211 U.S. 529 (1909)
("discharge without honor").
12. See AR 635-200, § IL para. 5 (April 8, 1959); Pasley, Sentece First-Verdct
Afterwards: Dislunwrable Discharges Witliout Trial by Court-Martial, 41 Comlxn. LQ.
545, 548-57 (1956). See also United States v. Calins, 20 C.M.R. 543, 548 (Navy Bd. Rev.
1955). An exception to these principles was the administrative issuance of Dishonorable
Discharges to the twenty-one American servicemen who refused repatriation following
the Korean armistice. The Defense Secretary's action, which was never tested in court,
has been severely criticized. See Pasley, mupra.
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Clear indicia of the statutory and constitutional power of the military to
issue less-than-Honorable administrative discharges to other than full-time
servicemen do not emerge from analogous principles of the law of court-
martial.' 3 In wartime, civilian employees accompanying the armed forces are
liable to court-martial, 14 but the peacetime jurisdiction of courts-martial over
such employees (or dependants of servicemen) is unsettled.1" A draft-eligible
person cannot be court-martialed prior to actual induction ;16 nor can a man
who 'has been discharged for the purpose of returning to civilian life.17
13. Persons on active duty are subject to court-martial for offenses committed while
in that status. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858).
14. Hines v. Mikell, 259 Fed. 28 (4th Cir. 1919) ; In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.
Ohio 1944); In re DiBartolo, 50 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); MeCune v. Kilpatrick,
53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943) ; see 10 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1958).
Even if martial law has been declared, civilians with no relationship to the armed forces
may not be court-martialed if civil courts remain open. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S.
304 (1946); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). The "open-court rule," how-
ever, has been criticized as "mechanical." FAIR-MAN, MARTIAL RULE 24-25, 156-67 (2d ed.
1943).
15. Courts-martial have no jurisdiction in peacetime over civilian dependents accom-
panying the armed forces overseas who are accused of capital offenses. Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957). Cases now before the Supreme Court test the extension of this immunity
to peacetime noncapital offenses of dependents and both capital and noncapital offenses of
employees accompanying the armed forces overseas. See Grisham v. Taylor, 261 F,2d 204
(3d Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 978 (1959) (capital offense of employee) ; United
States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359
U.S. 904 (1959) (noncapital offense of employee) ; United States ex rel. Wilson v. Boh-
lander, 167 F. Supp. 791 (D. Colo. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 906 (1959) (noncapital
offense of employee) ; Kinsella v. Singleton, 164 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.W. Va. 1958), prob.
juris, noted, 359 U.S. 903 (1959) (noncapital offense of dependent). In these cases, except
Guagliardo, the lower courts sustained court-martial jurisdiction. Compare WINTuRor,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 107 (2d ed. 1920) [hereinafter cited as WINTHROP] (' A
statute cannot be framed by which a civilian can lawfully be made amenable to the military
jurisdiction in time of peace.").
16. 10 U.S.C. § 802(1) (1958). "Actual induction" has been defined by the Supreme
Court to include the taking of the oath prescribed by military authority. Billings v. Trues-
dell, 321 U.S. 542 (1944) (conscientious objector who refused to take draft oath declared
immune from court-martial under applicable statute). "Volunteers" are subject to military
jurisdiction "from the time of their muster or acceptance into the armed forces." Reservists
recalled to active duty, as "other persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or
for training in, the armed forces," are subject to court-martial "from the dates when they
are required by the terms of the call or order to obey it." See In re La Plata's Petition,
174 F. Supp. 884, 887 (E.D. Mich. 1959) ; 10 U.S.C. § 802(1) (1958) ; ef. Martin v. Mott,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) ; Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820) (mill-
tiamen immune from court-martial under applicable statutes until mustered into service at
the place of rendezvous).
17. United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949) ; United States ex
rel. Roberson v. Keating, 121 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ill. 1949) ; Ex parte Drainer, 65 F. Supp.
410 (N.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd sub nort. Gould v. Drainer, 158 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1947) (in-
terpretations of applicable statutes). In Hirshberg, a discharge from one enlistment, al-
though followed a day later by reenlistment for a second term, was held to give the dis-
chargee "civilian" status and hence immunity from court-martial for a military offense
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Although retired career men receiving pensions have been held subject to
court-martial for offenses committed during retirement, 8 Retired Reservists
are so subject only when they are receiving hospitalization from the armed
forces.' 9 Inactive reservists have generally been held immune from court-
martial for conduct occurring during the reserve period 20 and for offenses
committed during his first term of duty. The absence of civil jurisdiction over his person
meant that he was able to escape prosecution. Congress attempted to close this jurisdictional
gap by enacting article 3 (a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, cl. 169, 64 Stat. 109
(1950) (now 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1958)), which provided that, subject to certain time
limitations of articles 43(b) and (c), ch. 169, 64 Stat. 121 (1950) (now 10 U.S.C. §§
843(b), (c) (1958)),
any person charged with having committed, while in a status in which he was sub-
ject to this chapter, an offense against this Code, punishable by confinement for five
years or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United
States or any State, or Territory thereof, or of the District of Columbia, shall not
be relieved from amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination
of said status.
The Supreme Court, in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), held
article 3 (a) unconstitutional as applied to a dischargee, declaring the post discharge period
"civilian" and unalterably free from military intervention. Other cases, however, on facts
similar to those of Hirshberg, have sustained court-martial jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted during the original enlistment when the offender sought discharge for the purpose
of reenlistment, on the grounds that there was no effective "hiatus" which gave the soldier
civilian status between discharge and almost immediate reenlistment. E.g., United States
v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.CM.1A. 506, 22 C.M.R 296 (1957); United States v. Solinshy, 2
U.S.C.M.A. 153, 7 C.M.R. 29 (1953).
Where the dischargee has fraudulently obtained his discharge certificate from the mili-
tary, the fraud effectively voids his discharge and the military possesses continuing juris-
diction. See 10 U.S.C. § 803(b) (1958) ; cf. Kronberg v. White, 84 F. Supp. 392 (N.D.
Cal. 1949), aff'd .sb non. Kronberg v. Hale, 180 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Terry v. United
States, 2 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash. 1933). But cf. United States ex rel. Flannery v.
Commanding General, 69 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Wm"rnRop 92-93. Persons serv-
ing a sentence imposed by court-martial are still subject to military law. Kahn v. Ander-
son, 255 U.S. 1 (1921) ; Mosher v. Hunter, 143 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1944) ; see 10 U.S.C.
§ 802(7) (1958).
M8 See, e.g., Hooper v. Hartman, 163 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (under 10 U.S.C.
§ 802(4) (1958)).
19. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(5) (1958).
20. United States ex rel. Boscola v. Bledsoe, 152 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Wash. 1956)
(recall to active service for purpose of court-martial not permitted by statute allowing re-
call of an enlisted man on retired list "for such duty as he may be able to perform"). But
cf. United States ex rel. Pasela v. Fenno, 167 F.2d 593 (2d Cir.), cert. disnissed per stip-
idation of counsel, 335 U.S. 806 (1948) (Fleet Reservist held subject to court-martial for
offense committed while not on active duty). The Uniform Code of Military Justice sub-
jects members of a reserve component to court-martial "while they are on inactive duty
training authorized by written orders which are voluntarily accepted by them and which
specify that they are subject to this chapter." 10 U.S.C. § 802(3) (1958) ; see Hearings
on. HIR. 2498 Before a Subcominittec of the House Committee on Aned Serices, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 883 (1949). See generally Colby, The Legal Status of Meb:ers of the
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committed on active duty,2 1 but courts-martial may try serious active-duty
offenses of inactive reservists if no United States civilian court has jurisdic-
tion over the offense.2
Olenick v. Brucker 23 is among the first attempts to secure a judicial deter-
mination of the military's authority to issue a less-than-Honorable administra-
tive discharge for activities engaged in during the inactive reserve period.
2 1
Olenick was undesirably discharged because, while an inactive Ready Reserv-
ist, he was allegedly connected with two groups listed by the Attorney General,
one as a Communist "front," the other as a Communist "adjunct. '20 Inducted
into the army in February 1953, Olenick was honorably separated from active
duty in December 1954, and transferred to the Ready Reserve, He was never
called to report for training.2" In January 1956, Olenick was sent a letter from
the Adjutant General's office informing him of a prospective Undesirable Dis-
charge based on information which furnished "reason to believe that [his]
.. retention . . would not be clearly consistent with the interests of national
security in accordance with Army Regulation 604-10,"27 the army's security
regulation.2s Olenick did not exercise his right to a military hearing, but
Officers' Reserve Corps, 21 MiNN. L. REv. 162 (1937); Colby & Glass, The Legal Status
of the National Guard, 29 VA. L. REv. 839 (1943).
21, See United States ex rel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, 265 Fed. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1920);
United States ex rel. Goodrich v. MacDonald, E.D.N.Y., Feb. 25, 1920 (unreported de-
cision, cited and relied upon in United States ex rel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, supra at 698) ;
United States ex rel. Santantonio v. Warden or Keeper of Naval Prison, 265 Fed. 787
(E.D.N.Y. 1919) (members of Naval Reserve Force held subject to laws governing the
Navy only during their period of active duty and not throughout their full period of enlist-
ment) ; ef. 31 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 521 (1919). Compare In, re La Plata's Petition, 174 F.
Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1959), which subjects to court-martial an active Ready Reservist
who, for failure to meet his annual training requirements under the 1955 Reserve Forces
Act, was ordered to active duty and refused to report.
22. See Wheeler v. Reynolds, 164 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Fla. 1958), upholding the ap-
plication to inactive reservists of article 3 (a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, ch.
169, 64 Stat. 109 (1950) (now 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1958)). The active-duty crime alleged
was premeditated murder in Germany.
23. 173 F. Supp. 493 (D.D.C. 1959), rev'd and remanded, No. 15177, D.C. Cir., Dec.
3, 1959.
24. See Bland v. Hartman, 245 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1957) ; McTernan v. Rodgers, 113
F. Supp. 638 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
25. See Brief for Appellee, p. 2.
26. See Brief for Appellant, p. 2. Olenick was inducted under the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. Apr. §§ 451-73
(1952), as amended, 50 U.S.C. Apr. §§ 452-70 (Supp. V, 1958), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.
App. §§ 454, 456 (Supp. 1958). See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
27. Brief for Appellee, p. 2.
28. Olenick was offered four alternative courses of action, -pursuant to AR 604-10,
para. 17(b) (July 29, 1955). He could: elect not to reply to the allegations; within five
days of receipt of the letter, submit a request in writing for a personal hearing before a
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instead replied that available hearing procedures were inadequate and a
"sham."2 9 He offered no evidence to explain or rebut the charges, although
he had been advised that silence might be taken as an admission of their truth.P
Undesirably discharged approximately a year later,31 and unsuccessful in
appeals to the Army Discharge Review Board and the Army Board for Cor-
rection of Military Records, 32 he commenced suit in the district court for
the District of Columbia to have his Undesirable Discharge declared null and
void and to have it replaced with an Honorable Discharge.33 He contended
that the Secretary had no statutory authority to issue a less-than-Honorable
discharge to him based on his activities while essentially a civilian, and that,
were the Secretary's action within the statute, the statute as thus interpreted
was unconstitutional under the guarantees of the first and fifth amendments.3
"field board" of inquiry; within fifteen days of receipt of the letter, in lieu of appearance
before such board, submit a letter of rebuttal together with such affidavits, statements or
other documentary evidence as he might desire; or, in lieu of further proceedings, request
retirement if eligible, or request discharge. 173 F. Supp. at 495. It was understood that
choice of the last alternative would be followed by an Undesirable Discharge. Brief for
Appellant, p. 2.
29. 173 F. Supp. at 495; Brief for Appellee, p. 3. He stated that he had been advised
that he would not have the right to confront those who testified against him, to cross-
examine confidential informants, or to subpoena witnesses. Ibid.
30. Brief for Appellee, p. 20.
31. The briefs disagree on whether he was discharged in February or April 1957.
Compare Brief for Appellant, p. 2, wsth Brief for Appellee, pp. 3, & AR 604-10, para.
19(b) (July 29, 1955) provided that "AR 604-10 applies" should be stamped on each
derogatory discharge under its terms, indicating that the dischargee was considered a
security risk, see Schustack v. Herren, 234 F.2d 134, 135 (2d Cir. 1956). Olenick's certifi-
cate was presumably so stamped.
32. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552, 1553 (1958).
33. The remedy sought is in effect a writ of mandamus. The District Court for the
District of Columbia, unlike other United States District Courts, has original mandamus
jurisdiction. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 522, 623-25 (138) ; DAvis, AD-
miNIsTRATvE LAW TREATISE §§ 23.09-12, 24.03 (1958) ; HAr & WVscHsum, TnE FarnAL
CouRrs AND THE FEDERAsL SYSTE 1180-87 (1953) ; cf. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-305, 11-306,
16-1001 (1951).
Until the Legislative Reorganization Act, ch. 753, § 207, 60 Stat. 837 (1946) (now 10
U.S.C. § 1552 (1958)), Congress had provided for the correction of unjust or erroneous
discharges by private legislative bills, see Goldstein v. Johnson, 184 F2d 342, 343 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 879 (1950).
34. Brief for Appellant, pp. 6-7. Olenick actually attacked the constitutionality of AR
604-10, promulgated pursuant to the statute. Since, however, the question of constitutionality
would not arise unless the regulation as applied was authorized by statute, it would seem
that the constitutional arguments go to the validity of the statute as interpreted. A third
constitutional argument, that the standards of AR 604-10-particularly use of the word
"subversive"-are unconstitutionally vague, id. at 7, seems to have less merit than the other
two, cf. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (upholding, as
sufficiently definite, the statutory standards: "affiliated" with Communist Party and "sup-
ports" organization believing in overthrow of government by "illegal or unconstitutional
methods").
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In urging that the Secretary of the Army exceeded his statutory authority,
Olenick relied heavily on Harmon v. Brucker,8 5 where the Secretary attempted
to base an Undesirable Discharge on preinduction associations.80 The Supreme
Court interpreted the word "records" in the statute providing for administra-
tive review "based upon all available records of the [Army] ... relating to",1
the person issued a discharge by the Secretary 3s to mean "records of military
service." To ensure a basis for discharge coterminous with the basis of review,
the Court further held that Congress intended the characterization of a dis-
charge to be grounded solely on the individual's ",military record" in the
armed forces.3 9 Preinduction activities were held beyond the scope of this
record; thus the Secretary had no statutory authority to base a less-than-
Honorable characterization upon these activities. 40 Since the Court disposed
of the case on statutory grounds, it was able to avoid the thorny constitutional
questions raised by the Secretary's action.
Unlike the Supreme Court in Harmon, the Olenick district court held the
discharge at bar validly issued. Olenick's argument that his activities while
an inactive reservist were outside his "military record" because he, like Har-
35. 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam). Harmon itself involved a soldier on active
duty; Abrainowitz v. Brucker, decided with it, involved an inactive reservist.
36. The Army Discharge Review Board, in the course of a general review of military
-personnel security cases, recharacterized the discharge as "General" before the case reached
the court of appeals. See Harmon v. Brucker, 243 F.2d 613, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
37. 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a) (1958) (formerly 38 U.S.C. § 693(h)).
38. The Secretary of the Army's authority to issue discharges to inducted or enlisted
individuals derives from 10 U.S.C. § 3811 (1958) (formerly 10 U.S.C. § 652(a)), which
contains no explicit limitation on the basis for the Secretary's action.
39. The court relied heavily upon the Army's own insistence that the discharge certifi-
cate "specify the character of service rendered during the period covered by the discharge,"
AR 615-375, para. (2) (b) (now AR 635-200, § III, para. 8(a) (April 8, 1959)). Al-
though the Harmon case did not explicitly discuss 10 U.S.C. §§ 1162:63 (1958), the statutes
authorizing discharge of reservists in all services and considered in Olenick, the appli-
cation of the "military record" limitation to them seems certain.
40. By allowing judicial review of claims that military officials had exceeded their
statutory or constitutional power, Harmon reversed previous decisions holding discharge
action by a service secretary nonreviewable by civil courts. See Schustack v. Herren, 234
F.2d 134, 135 (2d Cir. 1956); Davis v. Woodring, 111 F.2d 523, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
Marshall v. Wyman, 132 F. Supp. 169, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Nordmann v. Woodring, 28
F. Supp. 573, 575 (W.D. Okla. 1939); Reid v. United States, 161 Fed. 469, 472 (S.D.N.Y.
1908), writ of error dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 211 U.S. 529 (1909). But see Levin
v. Gillespie, 121 F. Supp. 726, 727 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
The practice of considering preinduction activities as a basis for discharge had been
widely criticized. See BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY 467 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
BROWN]; Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 94 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 353-534 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Security and Constitutional Rights]; U.S. CoMm'N ON
GOVRNMENT SEcURITY, REPORT 147-48 (1957) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT CoMM'N
REP.]; 57 Mica. L. REv. 130, 131 (1958); 42 MINN. L. REv. 135, 137 (1957). But see
Miller, Judicial Review of Administrative Discretiott-Charactertiation of Discharge, 4
MILITARY L. REV. 123, 133 (1959).
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mon, was essentially a civilian when he took part in them was rejected.
Harmon was summarily distinguished as applicable only to the preinduction
period when "it is clear that a person is a 'civilian'" and not subject to military
control.41 The court implied that the reason activities of the preinductee are
not part of his "military record," and not subject to military regulation, is that
prior to induction the individual owes no responsibilities to the Army.42 In
contrast, the court inferred from the statute setting forth the purpose of the
reserves 43 that all reservists are subject to a measure of military control
because they are obligated to maintain themselves in a state of "readiness"
for full-time service. It followed that any reservist who does not possess the
qualifications expected of an active-duty serviceman-among which reliability
in fulfilling security assignments was considered of great importance--can be
immediately screened out by discharge. Olenick conceded the Army's power
to discharge him, however; his contention was that his discharge must be
Honorable. To this claim the court replied, "[T] he very kind of information
that may justify termination of service prior to the end of the usual period
is also relevant in deciding the nature of the discharge to be granted.144
The court of appeals reversed the district court on the ground that "approved
findings of a board of officers"--a statutory prerequisite to most less-than-
Honorable administrative discharges 4 -- were not included in the appeal record
and ordered the case reopened below for inclusion of such findings.4 0 The
court expressed inability to determine "whether, and if so, how" paragraphs
3(b) and 13(d) of AR 604-10 were applied in Olenick's case. Paragraph
3(b) provides that an inductee shall normally be discharged as a security risk
only if his retention is inconsistent with national security. This standard
is intentionally less stringent than the not clearly consistcnt test which applies
41. 173 F. Supp. at 495-96.
42. Ibid.
43. 10 U.S.C. § 262 (1958). For the text of the statute, see text at note 54 infra.
44. 173 F. Supp. at 496. This is the same argument that had been endorsed by the
court of appeals in Harmon:
If . . . [the Army] could make . . . [the] determination [that Harmon was a
security risk,] as admittedly it could, and upon that basis could determine whether
a man was suitable for any service whatsoever, it could include that consideration
among the factors to be considered in determining the value of his service and,
consequently, in selecting the type of discharge to be given him.
Harmon v. Brucker, 243 F.2d 613, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rcz-d per curian, 355 U.S. 579
(1.958). This theory is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Harmion that
although the Secretary could issue Harmon a discharge, he could not use preinductiun
activities as a basis for characterizing that discharge-that is, although he can rid the ser-
vice, within the limitations of due process, of those he suspects as security risks, he may
not stigmatize them unless their conduct is part of their "military record." One writer dis-
misses the argument advanced by the court of appeals in Harmon (and now by the District
Court in Olenick) as a "rationalization" put forth by the military departments to explain
discharges which are not based on "service rendered" to the military. Jones 936 n.66.
45. See 10 U.S.C. § 1163(c) (1958).
46. Olenick v. Brucker, No. 15177, D.C. Cir., De. 3, 1959.
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to other categories of personnel. Paragraph 13(d) provides that connection
with organizations listed by the Attorney General shall be "but one factor,"
along with such matters as the individual's age, military service, and overall
performance of duty, in determining whether such connection warrants further
investigation. The court declared that the absence from the appeal record
of adequate findings blocked proper exercise of judicial review and implied
that if none had been made, or if new ones were offered nunc pro tunc, the
discharge should be invalidated by the district court.47 But disposition of the
appeal on the basis of the Army's failure to comply with procedures prescribed
by statute and regulation does not, of course, resolve the fundamental statutory
and constitutional problems raised by the case. If the missing findings were
in fact made, these troublesome issues will presumably again be presented to
the court of appeals. If on the other hand, they do not exist, as the appellate
court's statement that "counsel do not know whether any such findings were
* . .made" 48 seems to indicate, or if they improperly reflect AR 604-10's re-
quirements, as suggested by the reference in the Adjutant General's letter to
the "not clearly consistent" test,49 the Olenick case itself loses significance.
But a similar discharge could conform with prescribed procedures in the
future and the courts would then be confronted with substantially the same
questions posed by Olenick below.50
The statutory issue involved is whether a man's activities while an inactive
reservist are part of his "military record" and therefore, under Harmon, a
proper basis for a less-than-Honorable administrative discharge. Solution is
not facilitated by resort to the labels "civilian" or "military"; they only obscure
the fact that an inactive reservist may be a hybrid-"civilian" for most
purposes but "military" for others.51 Similarly, inquiry whether an individual's
47. Administrators of a program involving discharge of personnel must, in effecting
such discharge, follow the procedures prescribed by statute and regulation for the pro-
gram's administration; failure to comply with these procedures will invalidate such dis-
charge. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) ; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) ;
Coleman v. Brucker, 257 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1958). These cases, cited by the Olenfck court
of appeals, involved attempts, aborted by infirmities in the administrative proceedings, to
discharge civilian personnel under various government loyalty-security programs.
48. Olenick v. Brucker, No. 15177, D.C. Cir., Dec. 3, 1959.
49. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
50. An amendment to AR 604-10 increases the likelihood of such a case. Now all per-
sonnel are governed by the "not clearly consistent" standard. See AR 604-10, para. 12
(May 15, 1957), in 2 Gov'T SEc. & LOYALTY MANUAL 31:71-72 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as LOYALTY MANUAL].
51. Wheeler v. Reynolds, 164 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Fla. 1958), describes the anomalous
state of the reservist:
[F]or non-military purposes and for purpose of receiving various veteran's benefits,
.. [a reservist] occupies the same relationship to the government respectively, as
do other citizens who have had no military connection or as to discharged veterans
who have had such relations but who have no further statutory military obligations,
present or prospective. Nonetheless, by reason of his military obligation [which the
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"connection" with the military is sufficiently dose to justify military control
over him 52 seems helpful only in the most obvious cases and obfuscates the
need for criteria for defining "sufficient connection." The district court in
Olenick, however, properly perceived that whether a man is subject to any
degree of military control for a particular act depends upon whether that act
violates a responsibility he owes to the military, and thus gave new dimension
to the "military record" concept.53 An answer to the statutory question must
begin, therefore, with a determination of the inactive reservist's military re-
sponsibilities.
The Olenick district court held that the reservist is obligated to maintain the
same "qualifications" as an active-duty serviceman. The court did not limit
its holding to the particular responsibility-maintenance of a reliable security
status-or the particular reservist in question, but instead equated the total
military responsibilities of all reservists with those of the full-time soldier.
This finding was based solely on interpretation of the following statutory
provision:
The purpose of the reserve components is to provide trained units and
qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time
of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national
security requires, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during.
and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and
qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and
persons are needed than are in the regular components."4
It seems unlikely that Congress would rely upon such general language to
impose upon the reservist a duty to refrain from otherwise lawful conduct
simply because such conduct is forbidden the active-duty serviceman. This
assumption is reenforced in this context, where violation of a duty thus created
court defines as response to active duty orders in war or emergency] and reserve
status, however inactive or limited it may be, for the military purposes intended by
Congress to be served by the creation and maintenance of the present reserve com-
ponents of the armed forces, petitioner, when released from active duty, was not a
full-fledged civilian, nor in the same status as a discharged veteran, but vas an Air-
man Third Class of the Air Force Reserve.
Id. at 955. The reservist's quasi-military, quasi-civilian status is widely accepted. See
BRowN 467 ("uncertain status of a reservist"); Baldwin, The Rcserve Dispde, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 24, 1959, p. 2, cols. 4, 5. (" 'week-end warriors' ... civilians first and soldiers
and airmen second") ; Miller, supra note 40, at 134 ("in the broad sense of the term, a
member of the Army... [but] his conduct as a member of the civilian community would
appear to be more closely analogous to [preservice civilian conduct]") ; cf. 1951 Hearings
156 ("citizen-soldiers").
52. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 22-23, 32-33 (1957).
53. See Wheeler v. Reynolds, 164 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Fla. 1958). Harmon's definition
of the phrase "military record" was limited to a declaration that, under current army
regulations, it represented "service rendered during the period covered by the discharge."
355 U.S. at 583.
54. 10 U.S.C. § 262 (1958) ; see 173 F. Supp. at 496.
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would entail serious consequences-the issuance of a derogatory discharge.65
Even if the responsibilities of some reservists-active Ready Reservists, per-
haps-do equal those of men on active duty, to read this general provision
as imposing identical obligations on all reservists would be to ignore specific
statutory standards of "readiness" applicable to particular classes of reserves.
By its tripartite division of reserves into Ready, Standby, and Retired, Con-
gress intended that each reserve component should have a different status of
vulnerability to active-duty recall and presumably, therefore, a different
measure of overall military responsibility 6
55. Cf. Vallat v. The Radium Dial Co., 360 Ill. 407, 196 N.E. 485 (1935); State v.
Brunson, 162 La. 902, 111 So. 321 (1927) ; People v. Phyfe, 136 N.Y. 554, 32 N.E. 978
(1893).
56. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text. The tripartite division of reserves was
first used in the Armed Forces Reserve Act, ch. 608, 66 Stat. 481 (1952). General dis-
satisfaction with the disorganized and unsystematic recall of reservists to active duty In
the Korean conflict was probably responsible for this tripartite division. See 97 CoNo. REc.
13160 (1951). See also 1951 Hearings 67. In response, Congress passed the Armed Forces
Reserve Act, which "indicated that ... [Congress] wanted no more of the old Reserve
concept but rather the establishment of specific categories (Ready, Standby, and Retired
Reserves] so that each reservist would know his liability for future duty." H.R. REi,. No.
2445, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1952).
In addition to uncertainty about the order of recall during the Korean crisis, there was
dissatisfaction with the calling of large numbers of inactive reservists before trained and
paid units and individuals were called.
Because such an expansion [as Korea required] short of war, had niever previously
occurred, everyone assumed--certainly the reservists concerned-that those who were
being paid to maintain their state of training would be the first to be called, and
that the volunteers and certainly the inactive reservists, would not be called until
those who constituted a balanced force as reflected in the mobilization troop basis,
had been exhausted ....
1951 Hearings 385 (remarks of Colonel Maas); see 97 CoxG. REc. 13160 (1951). The
need in a mobilization for "trained groups of filler replacements parallel with organized
units for employment as units" was stressed. These specially trained individuals and units
from the Ready Reserve would be called in a future crisis before reservists who had not
been training. 1951 Hearings 384. For legislative discussion of the different degrees of
vulnerability to recall, see S. REP. No. 1795, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952) ; H.R. RE'. No.
1066, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1951) ; 1951 Hearings 221-22, 325-26, 380, 384, 405 (1951).
In the House debates on the bill, the Committee Chairman stated the distinction be-
tween Ready and Standby Reservists:
The Ready Reserve is the Reserve who, for a certain period of time, is eligible to
be called out during a limited emergency, such as you have in Korea .... When
he . . . [becomes a Standby Reservist] we provide that . . . [he] shall never be
called out except in time of all-out war .... So, in the future, Mr. Speaker, I would
say that the reservists will be in the Ready Reserves for 3 years, if he works hard,
subject to being called out when there is a limited crisis; but after that he is, to all
intents and purposes, short of all-out war ... out of the Reserve program. During
that 3-year period, when he will hold himself available, his employer knows that he
is subject to call. When he is out of that [and in the Standby Reserve] he can go
ahead, get married, rear the family, build the home, borrow money, go into business,
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Furthermore, examination of the inactive reservist's specific obligations
compels the conclusion that he is not expected to maintain a standard of
"readiness" coextensive with that of the active-duty soldier. The inactive
Ready or Standby Reservist is statutorily required to submit a certificate of
physical condition annually and to have a physical examination every four
years,57 while any inactive reservist must obtain the approval of the appro-
priate secretary if he wishes to enter the civil employ of a foreign govern-
ment.58 In the event of war or a national emergency, an inactive Ready
Reservist can be called to active service by either congressional or presidential
declaration; recall of Standbys and Retireds, however, requires declaration
by Congress.52 In contrast to these minimal or contingent responsibilities,
Standby, Retired, and inactive Ready Reservists are neither required nor ex-
pected to report for drill or training."0 And the pickwickian nature of a
"Ready" Reservist's "readiness," be he active or inactive, was acknowledged
by those government representatives who testified before the House Armed
Services Committee that it would take intensive training of four to six months
to prepare active reservists and six to nine months to prepare inactive re-
servists for effective combat duty."' The only significant military responsibility
of the inactive reservist which may be inferred from the general statute cited
and he will have the assurance that he will not be subject to call with every passing
emergency that may come along.
Further than that, that employer will know that when he employes [sic] a reser-
vist in the future, if he is in the Standby Reserves, he will not be subject to being
called out, and to all intents and purposes he will be a permanent employee of the
employer.
97 CONG. REC. 13157, 13158 (1951) (remarks of Representative Brooks). The Retired
Reservist is less vulnerable to recall than the Standby Reservist. See 1951 Hearings 221-.
57. 10 U.S.C. § 1004(a) (1958).
58. 10 U.S.C. § 1032 (1958).
59. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 672-73 (1958).
60. Voluntary participation in the pre-1955 Reserve Program was stressed. "The man
that attends an organized unit and drills by compulsion contributes nothing and learns
nothing." 1951 Hearings 433 (remarks of Colonel Maas). Absent Army orders, no penalty
attached to failure to train with an active reserve unit.
61. 1951 Hearings 217, 230-31. See also id. at 187-88, 325 (testimony of Ass't Sec'y of
Defense Rosenberg).
Originally, the draft bill provided that Ready Reservists should be "available for im-
mediate employment in the expansion of the armed forces." 1951 Hearings 324. This phrase
was altered to read "available for prompt entry into the active military service." Id. at 609.
In its final form the phrase was changed to "liable for active duty." 10 U.S.C. § 268 (1958).
In 10 U.S.C. § 262 (1958), which the district court cited in Olenick to support its finding
that reservists have a responsibility to maintain active-duty standards of fitness, the for-
mulation was altered from the proposed "immediate availability for active duty" to "avail-
able for active duty." 1951 Hearings 582-83. The drafter of the bill agreed that the final
formulation was "somewhat smoother and more precise." Id. at 583. The meaning of the
word "Ready" in "Ready Reserve" emerges from the following exchange at the subcom-
mittee hearings:
General Reckord: As close as I have been to this problem all my life, I understood
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by the Olenick district court, therefore, is to be available for and respond to a
call to active duty in a war or national emergency 02 rather than to be prepared
for immediate fulfillment of all active-duty assignments.
Since an inactive reservist is not required to maintain all active-duty stand-
ards of fitness, the question arises whether he owes a specific responsiblity
to the military to maintain a reliable security status. Such a responsibility does
not explicitly derive from statute. 3 Of the legislation other than the general
purpose statute applicable to the reserves, only title 10, section 1163(c) of
the United States Code 04 is even tangentially in point. This statutory sub-
section, which on its face is solely procedural, provides that a reservist
separated "for cause" must be issued an Honorable or General Discharge
this word "Ready" to mean that these units in the Ready Reserve were ready
to go out immediately in an emergency, immediately. Now-
Congressman Brooks: Well, in that sense they are certainly at present not ready to
go out immediately. But in the psychological sense that they know that they
will be called initially-
1951 Hearings 523. See also id. at 325, 477, 651-52; Galloway 478 ("[Because few Ready
Reservists trained under the 1952 Act] the term "Ready" had come to mean that the in-
dividual reservist knew he was ready for recall-it did not mean that the Nation had a
militarily Ready Reserve.").
62. Cf., e.g., Hilton v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 386 (1943) (under 1916 statute creating
the Naval Reserve Force, one who enrolled therein did no more than obligate himself to
serve when called upon, in war or national emergency declared by President).
63. No specific statutory authority exists for military security programs, which have
been in operation since 1948. "Military Personnel Security, unlike other Government
screening programs, rests neither on Congressional enactment nor Executive Order but is
based on the inherent disciplinary powers of the military organizations." 2 LOYALTY"
MANUAL 31:1. AR 604-10 (July 29, 1955), as amended, was promulgated pursuant to Dept
of Defense Directive 5210.9 (April 7, 1954), as amended, in 2 LOYALTY MAIUAL 31:56,
which had borrowed most of its standards from the Federal Employees Loyalty Security
Program, established pursuant to Executive Order 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953), and
Act of Aug. 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 476 (1950), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1958). The Ex-
ecutive Order, which was upheld on the grounds that the President has authority to set
standards for civil servants, see Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd
per curiam by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), was by its terms not appli-
cable to military personnel. For a general discussion of the background of the military
programs, see WRIGHT Com'N REP. 111-15. Pressure for greater care in administering
the Army program resulted in an Army directive calling for more sophistication and under-
standing in applying the security standards in the regulations. See id. at 115-19.
64. A member of a reserve component who is separated therefrom for cause, except
under subsection (b) [absent without authority for at least 3 months, or sentenced
by a civil court to confinement in a penitentiary or correctional institution], is el-
titled to a discharge under honorable conditions unless-(1) he is discharged under
conditions other than honorable under an approved sentence of court-martial or under
the approved findings of a board of officers convened by an authority designated by
the Secretary concerned; or (2) he consents to a discharge under conditions other
than honorable with a waiver of proceedings of a court-martial or a board.
10 U.S.C. § 1163(c) (1958).
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unless he is discharged under the approved sentence of a court-martial or the
approved findings of a board of officers or consents to a derogatory discharge
and waives court-martial or board proceedings. It in no way enunciates sub-
stantive grounds for discharge. 5 Nonetheless, the Government has argued,
apparently on the basis of implications drawn from a subpart of 1163(c)
considered in committee but deleted before presentation to the House, that
in this statute Congress "recognized and acquiesced in" the issuance to re-
servists of Undesirable Discharges for security reasons."0 Subpart 3 authorized
the Secretary to dispense with a hearing if he determined that "a hearing is
not in the best interests of the Government for security reasons."0 7 Literally
read, this provision would have simply created an exception to the procedural
rule of 1163(c) (1) that the prospective Undesirable Dischargee must be
afforded a hearing. But the Government seems to argue that if the Secretary
is authorized to deny a hearing for security reasons, it ineluctably follows he
is also authorized to issue an Undesirable Discharge to a reservist for being
a security risk. Such an interpretation fails to recognize that valid "security
reasons" may exist for withholding a hearing when the prospective discharge
is based on a matter totally unrelated to an individual's security status. For
example, if the Army seeks to issue a soldier an Undesirable Discharge for
negligence in operating an atomic device, the Secretary, seeking to prevent
public disclosure of the device's mechanism, would have excellent security
reasons for withholding a hearing; yet this is not a discharge for security
reasons.68 And, even assuming that subpart 3 was an indirect congressional
recognition of security discharges for reservists, 0 its subsequent omission
65. See Hearings oa Security and Constilutional Rights 472 (statement of Stephen
Jackson, Ass't General Counsel, Dep't of Defense).
66. See Brief for Appellee, pp. 15-16.
67. Id. at 15; 1951 Hearings 313.
68. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
69. The only suggestion that § 1163 (c) may have adverted to security-risk discharges
of reservists was a statement in the House Armed Services Committee report, promulgated
prior to the deletion of subpart 3, that § 1163(c)
requires a member of the reserve components discharged for cause to be given a
discharge under honorable conditions unless dropped from the rolls under subsection
(b), discharged pursuant to sentence of a court martial or pursuant to findings of a
board of officers, discharged for security reasons, or discharged after waiver of
court-martial or board proceedings.
H.R. Ra,. No. 1066, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1951). (Emphasis added.) This statement
was taken bodily from the explanation of § 1163(c) (then § 250(c) of the draft bill) in
committee. See 1951 Hearings 884. The House Committee chairman expected "considerable
discussion!' on § 1163, but received practically none. Id. at 881-84. Its supposed security
features were ignored by the Senate and Joint Conference Committees. See S. REP. No.
1795, 82d ong., 2d Sess. 34 (1952) ; H.R. REP. No. 2445, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). The
only committee discussion of security unreliability occurred in a totally different conte.-t.
See 1951 Hearings 1082-1104 (involving the ability of the military to release a reservist
serving on active duty under battle conditions).
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from the statute at least obscures congressional intent.70 In view of 1163(c)'s
literal meaning and the ambiguity of its legislative history, it should not be
construed specifically to impose upon the reservist a statutory obligation to
refrain from engaging in political activities which may be considered damaging
to his security status.
Because of the absence of a general responsibility to maintain all active-duty
fitness standards and a specific statutory duty to maintain reliability for se-
curity purposes, the status of an inactive reservist seems to be like that of a
preinductee. Indeed, many outward similarities exist between the inactive
reservist and the draft-eligible man. Neither has immediate military duties.
The reservist receives little more than the preinductee by way of privileges or
emoluments. 71 Both must remain available for and respond to a call to active
duty. Perhaps the preinductee, although not, strictly speaking, subject to call
by the military, but rather to selection by a civilian draft board, is more likely
to take up arms than his reservist brother, since no national emergency need
exist to call him to active duty.72 Were the status of the inactive reservist
equated with that of the preinductee, conduct during the inactive reserve period
would be unrelated to any military responsibility, and therefore, would be
outside the reservist's "military record." Thus, such conduct would not be
a legitimate basis for characterizing a discharge.73
70. The objection to subpart 3 which led to its deletion from the bill was apparently
procedural. See 97 CONG. REC. 13162 (1951). Yet the Senate's description of the bill in the
form in which it finally passed the House contained no mention of security grounds for
discharge. See S. REP. No. 1795, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1951).
71. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 10, 11; Brief for Appellee, pp. 8, 9.
72. The President is authorized . . . whether or not a state of war exists, to select
and induct into the Armed Forces of the United States for training and service ...
such number of persons as may be required to provide and maintain the strength
of the Armed Forces.
Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 606 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C.
App. § 454(a) (1952), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 454(a) (Supp. V, 1958). (Emphasis
added.) A reservist may not be recalled in the absence of a war or national emergency.
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 272-73 (1958). On the other hand, an arguably greater chance may exist
that a man will be rejected for military service prior to induction than when he is a reser-
vist subject to active-duty recall.
From September, 1948, to November, 1958, the rejection rate for draftees for physical,
mental or moral reasons was 38.3 per cent. In the same period there was a further
rejection by the armed forces of 6.6 per cent of those passed by their draft boards.
The rate has since risen as a result of an amendment to the law which permits the
services to turn down men of such low mental capability that they are virtually un-
trainable.
Baldwin, Our Fighting Men, Have Gone Soft, Saturday Evening Post, Aug. 18, 1959, p.
13, at 15.
73. See BROWN 467-68; Jones 932; Note, 47 GEo. L.J. 185, 188 (1950) ; cf. Colby, The
Legal Status of Members of the Officers' Reserve Corps, 21 MixN. L. Rv. 162 (1937);
Colby & Glass, The Legal Status of the National Guard, 29 VA. L. Rxv. 839 (1943);
Miller, supra note 40, at 134. But see WRIGHT Comm'N REP. 145-47. Following Harmon,
the Army gave lengthy reconsideration to its policy of imposing its security program on
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But this conclusion should not be adopted without consideration of other
possible sources of such a responsibility. Section 3811(b) of title 10 provides
no specific grounds for derogatory administrative discharge of full-time
soldiers,74 but nonetheless active-duty servicemen surely have military respon-
sibilities, the breach of which would be valid grounds for an Undesirable
Discharge. From where, then, would an inactive reservist's responsibility to
the military (and the military's concomitant control over his conduct) come?
Because no specific statutory authorization is needed to give the military power
over full-time soldiers, it might be argued that the military has the same
inherent right to discipline the inactive reservist 7, for improper behavior. But
missing from the military's relationship with the inactive reservist are the close
contact and constant necessity for order and cooperation which justify dis-
ciplinary power over an active-duty serviceman.70 Further, an argument based
on inherent disciplinary power, like its implicit use of the label "soldier," runs
full circle, and therefore does not aid analysis of the basis for such power."1 The
Army's disciplinary power over a man rests on that man's military responsi-
bility, and invocation of an abstract right of discipline cannot be used to
prove the existence of such a responsibility. An inactive reservist's responsi-
bility, if any, to maintain a reliable security status, which must be established
before any disciplinary right obtains, is not as obvious as is the full-time
soldier's and therefore must come from statute.
As noted above, the general provision setting forth the purpose of the re-
serves implies that an inactive reservist is obligated to be available for and
respond to a call to active duty in a war or a national emergency.78 Arguably,
nonmaintenance of a reliable security rating, in view of the hard needs of
security,79 is a failure to be "available" and therefore a proper basis for a less-
than-Honorable discharge. But the objection that Congress would be unlikely
to utilize such general language to impose upon the inactive reservist a duty
to refrain from otherwise lawful conduct seems as valid when the duty in-
volved is solely maintenance of an active-duty security rating as when the duty
encompasses all the qualifications of a full-time soldier.8 0 Moreover, an inactive
reservist's security failings might be remediable during the months necessary
to prepare him for effective combat duty,8' while a full-time soldier's would
presumably be immediately debilitating. In light of the traditional reluctance
Standby Reservists, who are, except for a different degree of vulnerability to recall, in the
same military posture as non-training Ready Reservists. In the face of considerable criticism,
the Army retained its policy. See N.Y. Times, July 5, 1958, p. 1, col 3.
74. See 10 U.S.C § 3811(b) (1958).
75. Cf. 173 F. Supp. at 496 ("integral part of the army").
76. See Miller, mtpra note 40, at 134.
77. See text at note 51 srupra.
78. See text at note 62 mcpra.
79. See BRowN 1.
80. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 61 mipra and accompanying text.
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to extend the power of the military,8 2 courts should await a specific congres-
sional mandate before ruling that a dubious security rating justifies issuing an
inactive reservist a less-than-Honorable administrative discharge.
Should such a mandate be forthcoming, or should existing statutes be con-
strued to obligate an inactive reservist to maintain active-duty security require-
ments, even more difficult problems arise under the first and fifth amendments.
Having held the Secretary's action within his statutory prerogatives, the
Olenick district court inexplicably failed to pass on these constitutional issues.a
Essential to both constitutional arguments is a showing that a less-than-
Honorable administrative discharge imposes severe deprivations on its re-*
cipient. Courts, 84 commentators,8 5 legislators, 0 and the armed services sl
82. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33-35, 40 (1956) ; United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 1, 8 (1955) ; Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 323 (1946) ; Dow
v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 169 (1879); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124-25
(1866).
83. Perhaps the court was inhibited by pre-Harnion decisions that courts did not have
jurisdiction to review military administrative discharges. See cases cited in note 40 supro;
59 COLUU. L. REv. 950, 953 (1959). But Harmon, noting that by deciding that case on
statutory grounds it was avoiding constitutional issues raised by the petitioner, recognized
the jurisdiction of civil courts to review the constitutionality of the military's action and
the statutes upon which such action is based. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581 (1958).
84. E.g., Ives v. Franke, 271 F.2d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Bazelon, J., dissenting)
("anything less than an Honorable Discharge is commonly understood as an adverse re-
flection upon character") ; Harmon v. Brucker, 137 F. Supp. 475, 478 (D.D.C. 1956), aff'd,
243 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 355 U.S. 579 (1958)
("to an Honorable discharge accrue property rights, civil rights, and community respect
and honor . . . [but] one receiving an adverse discharge must expect to encounter sub-
stantial prejudice in civilian life") ; United States ex rel. Roberson v. Keating, 121 F. Supp.
477, 479 (N.D. Ill. 1949) ("deprive him of property rights, as well as civil rights and
personal honor"); Bernstein v. Herren, 136 F. Supp. 493, 498 (S.D.N.Y.), supplementol
opinion, 136 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), second opinion, 141 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 234 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 840 (1956) ("brand and stigmatize ...
irreparable injury undeniable") ; Nistal v. Hausauer, 282 App. Div. 7, 12, 121 N.Y.S.2d
712, 716 (1953), rev'd, 308 N.Y. 146, 124 N.E.2d 94 (1954), cert. dcued, 349 U.S. 962
(1955) ("impugns the character or reputation of a citizen"). But see Ives v. Franke, supra
at 471 (majority opinion) ("there is no connotation of dishonor in a general discharge
which expressly recites that it is 'under honorable conditions' "). Deprivation of the prop-
erty and personal rights accruing to an Honorable Discharge is a judicially cognizable in-
jury. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 582 (1958). Harmon cites AR 615-360, para. 7
(now AR 635-200, § III, para. 8(a) (April 8, 1959)), which described the adverse effect
of such a discharge on civilian rights and veterans' benefits, and Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), which involved the "constitutional tort" of de-
famation by arbitrary classification, see Comment, 9 STAN. L. Rav. 170, 180-82 (1956).
85. A recent and comprehensive work recognizes the "substantial stigma" of an Un-
desirable Discharge and the "serious deprivation" affected by a General Discharge stamped
with a security-risk indication. BaowN 86. It has also been asserted that the General Dis-
charge is a "sub-standard" indication which, when stamped with a security-risk indication
is "an effective bar to all public employment, virtually all defense industry employment,
and most other private employment where the discharge certificate has to be shown," and
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recognize that such discharges result in serious injury. The Undesirable Dis-
chargee, for example, is excluded from many federal ss and state 6 veterans'
that the Undesirable Discharge brings "dire and permanent consequences to the person re-
ceiving it....." VATTs, THE DRAFTEE AND INME NAL SEcurnr: A STUDY OF Tim ARMY"
Mn.raRy PERSONNEL SEcuRMa PRoaAM 80-82 (1955) [hereinafter cited as WATTs].
Other writers have emphasized the restrictions and stigma of such discharges. See, e.g.,
Jones 921-29; Comment, 9 STAN. L. REv. 170, 178-79 (1956) ; 57 Mica. L. Ray. 130, 131
(1958) ; 42 MINN. L. Rav. 135, 137-38 (1957).
86. Among the many bills recently introduced to counter the effects of such discharges
is the "Doyle Bill," H.R. 88, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). It provides for an "Exemplary
Rehabilitation Certificate" to be awarded a dischargee in place of a less-than-Honorable
discharge for minor offenses if, for three years or more after discharge, his civilian per-
formance meets with the military's satisfaction. Congressman Doyle stated that his bill
"will help remove some of the life stigma attaching to less-than-[H]onorable discharges.
It will also help a deserving man to get a chance to earn a decent living and hold his head
up. Let us treat a deserving man in a truly humane manner." 105 CO.G. Rrc 1104 (daily
ed. Jan. 27, 1959). For the background of this bill and numerous similar proposals, see
generally, Hearings on HR. 1108 Before a Special Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Arned Services, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Re-
habilitation Bill].
87. Each person facing derogatory discharge under the Army's security program must
be sent a statement summarizing the effect of such a discharge. See AR 604-10, para. 31(c)
(July 29, 1955), now AR 604-10, para. (b) (2) (fay 15, 1957). The statement reads:
I understand that I may be deprived of many rights as a veteran under both Federal
and state legislation, and that I may e.x-pect to encounter substantial prejudice in
civilian life in situations where the type of service rendered in any branch of the
Armed Forces or the character of discharge received therefrom may have a bearing.
The other services have similar statements. See Air Force Reg. 39-10, para. 8(d) (March
17, 1959) ("may militate severely against an airman in seeking postservice employment,
and may render him ineligible for entrance into college and other educational institutions").
88. By federal statute he is deprived of: a Government-provided headstone marker,
62 Stat. 1215 (1948), as amended, 24 U.S.C. § 279(a) (1958) ; burial in a national cemetery,
62 Stat. 234 (1948), 24 U.S.C. § 281 (1958) ; mustering-out payment, 72 Stat. 1222 (1958),
38 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (1958); payment for accrued leave, 60 Stat. 963-64 (1946), as
amended, 37 U.S.C. §§ 32(b), 33(d) (1958) ; transportation allowance for dependents and
shipment of household goods, Joint Travel Regulations paras. 7011-5 (July 1, 1959), 8009-4
(Sept. 1, 1959) ; Civil Service preference, 58 Stat. 387 (1944), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 851
(1958); and naturalization benefits, 66 Stat 250 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1440
(1958).
The Undesirable Dischargee suffers precisely the deprivations as a man receiving a Bad
Conduct Discharge pursuant to Special Court-Martial. For an "Incidents of Discharge"
chart, prepared by the Military Affairs Division of the Army Judge Advocate General's
office, listing the complete federal benefit scheme for each type of dischargee, see Hearings
on S. 3096 Before the Senate Armed Sertices Committee, 83d Cong., 2d $ess. 28-29 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Doctor Draft Amendments Hearings]. Each of the benefits described
therein is granted, denied, or left to agency discretion in the same manner in the case of
Undesirable Discharges as in the case of Bad Conduct Discharges pursuant to Special
Court-Martial. See also KIMBROUGH & GLEN, A ERicAN LAw or VmuANs §§ 8, 9 (2d
ed. 1954). For deprivations suffered by the recipient of a General Discharge, see W rrs
80; Comment, 9 STAN. L. REv. 170, 171 n.4 (1956).
89. New York, for example, denies the Undesirable Dischargee state civil service
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benefits. Other federal benefits are withheld from him unless an appropriate
federal agency, after reviewing the facts of the discharge, extends them as a
matter of discretion.90 More important, because about ninety per cent of
discharges are Honorable, 91 such discharges are regarded by the community
as indications of acceptable service, not as commendations for outstanding
service; conversely, less-than-Honorable discharges are regarded as signs of
past misconduct.9 2 Therefore, an unmistakable social stigma attaches to the
holder of a less-than-Honorable discharge, 93 which limits his opportunities
for public9 4 and private0 5 employment.
priority, N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 85; state educational scholarships providing up to $350
annually for a maximum of four years, N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 608(1) (§ 609 of this law makes
the children of an Undesirably Discharged disabled veteran ineligible for such state scholar-
ships) ; teacher's retirement allowances, N.Y. MIL. LAw § 245; a free vendor's license,
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 32; free recording of discharge, N.Y. MIL. LAW § 250; burial
privileges, N.Y. Mumic. LAW § 148; and welfare assistance, N.Y. Soc. WELFARLE LAW
§ 168-78.
90. The Veteran's Administration has such discretionary control over compensation
for service-connected disability, pension for nonservice-connected disability, vocational re-
habilitation, education and training, loans, unemployment compensation, special housing,
hospitalization, domiciliary care, out-patient medical treatment, prosthetic appliances, com-
pensation for service-connected death, pension for nonservice-connected death, burial ex-
pense, and burial flags. Similarly, the Department of Labor administers employment pref-
erence and unemployment compensation; the Social Security Administration controls social
security benefits. See JAG chart, in Doctor Draft Amendments Hearings 28-29. The only
benefits the Undesirable Dischargee is likely to get are those for which he is eligible as of
right: retirement pay for reserves, transportation in kind, farm and housing loans, and
preference in housing. Ibid.
91. From July 1, 1954, to July 1, 1956, 96.1% of all military discharges were under
honorable conditions, i.e., Honorable or General; 2.4% were Undesirable, while 1.5% were
Bad Conduct and Dishonorable. See Hearings on Rehabilitation Bill 2378-79 (testimony
of Major General Kuhfeld, Ass't Judge Advocate General, USAF). Department of De-
fense discharge statistics for fiscal years 1957 and 1958 indicate slightly less than a 90%
Honorable rate, and place the General discharge rate at approximately 4.8%, the Undesir-
able at approximately 4.2%. See 105 CONG. REc. 1106-07 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1959).
92. See Jones 928. The stigma attaching to an Undesirable Discharge is amusingly
illustrated by the reaction of one mother who protested the change of her son's discharge
from "Bad Conduct" to "Undesirable." She did not mind the Army's calling her son a bad
boy, but felt that nobody should call him undesirable. Hearings on Rehabilitation Bill 2407.
93. See Hearings on Rehabilitation Bill 2360 (testimony of Deputy Ass't Sec'y of
Defense Jackson: "I agree that an undesirable discharge or a bad-conduct discharge does
constitute on the [recipient] . . . a stigma."). The stigma of a derogatory discharge ap-
parently attaches to the dischargee's parents and family in many cases. Hearings oil Re-
habilitation Bill 3370 (remarks by Representative Doyle: "[W]hole families were in many
cases frowned upon by their neighbors because the boy ... got less than an honorable dis-
charge.") ; cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952).
94. See WATTS 80, 89. The following exchange from the Hearings on Security and
Constitutional Rights indicates a General Dischargee's Perception of the effect of the Gen-
eral Discharge on his public employment opportunities:
Mr. Hocker (committee counsel): Do you anticipate any difficulty in getting a
position under the circumstances?
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Although first and fifth amendment considerations are often interrelated,
separate treatment will facilitate analysis. The substantive-due-process stand-
ard of the fifth amendment requires that the injury imposed upon the inactive
reservist by issuance of a less-than-Honorable discharge bear a reasonable
relation to a legitimate military purpose. The primary rationale advanced
by the Army for the Secretary's power to base a less-than-Honorable discharge
on an inactive reservist's political associations is that such power is necessary
to protect the national security. 97 But the fact of discharge alone, without any
derogatory characterization, adequately protects this interest: separation of the
individual from the armed forces eliminates the possibility that he vill use
his position in the army to endanger the national security. Therefore, deroga-
tory discharge must be intended to further some additional military interest
while protecting the national security.
The Army claims that the power to issue a derogatory discharge in an
Olenick-type situation is also necessary to maintain military discipline.08 "Dis-
Mr. Witthoft: I think I do. My intentions are-my hopes are to teach school in
Chicago for the board of education.
Mr. Hocker: Do you know what the requirements with respect to that would be?
Mr. Witthoft: They would want to know the kind of discharge I would have, and
I do not know, but I think they would require an [H]onorable.
Hearings on Security and Constitutional Rights 409.
95. 1 know I cannot go out and get a job in electronics today because of this discharge.
Perhaps in some rare instance my military experiences would qualify me for a tech-
nical position with a commercial firm, but I doubt it.
Id. at 394-95 (testimony of a recipient of a General Discharge based on preinduction asso-
ciations, who, although he excelled in a competitive examination in radar and microwave
theory, was refused a job because he did not have an Honorable Discharge).
[I]f they go to apply for a position or a job, and it is... any hind of discharge
other than honorable, ordinarily they may as well not apply, because they are not
going to get a job. You can do all the explaining in the world, but there isn't a
chance if it doesn't say "honorable."
Doctor Draft Ainendinets Hearings 153 (statement of Senator Kefauver).
96. For discussion and application of a typical due-process analysis, see, e.g., Carolene
Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1944) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937) ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) ; Societe Interna-
tionale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales S.A. v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532,
540 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
97. Brief for Appellee, pp. 17, 22, describing this interest as the "right of the govern-
ment to self-preservation."
98. Id. at 23. The Government combines this argument with that of desecration of the
Honorable Discharge, see notes 101-02 infra and accompanying text:
To order that the army must grant an Honorable Discharge to each and every man
who has not been subject to a court-martial, regardless of the quality of his service
and deportment, would drain the word "honorable" of all meaning. The inevitable
result would be to impair discipline and morale, and to that extent to lower the
efficiency of the armed services.
Brief for Appellee, p. 23; see Doctor Draft Anendments Hearings 166 (testimony of
Secretary of Defense Wilson).
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cipline" in the sense of rehabilitation of the individual for effective fulfillment
of future military obligations is obviously precluded by his separation from
the service. The word must be used then in the sense of deterrence of others
in the military establishment who might themselves engage in similar activities.
On active duty, where obedience and fighting fitness are vital to the effective
fulfillment of military operations, this type of discipline is effective and neces-
sary.99 But the full-time soldier would remain subject to derogatory adminis-
trative discharge for active-duty associations which compromise his security
status and could derive no license if a more liberal standard were applied to
the inactive reservist. 100 But while use of the less-than-Honorable discharge
to deter inactive reservists as a class is subject to the criticism that the
scattered state of inactive reservists would hinder effective communication to
them of such disciplinary measures, such deterrence could probably be accom-
plished via the organs of public communication.
The argument that authority to issue a derogatory discharge to the inactive
reservist who participates in proscribed political activities is necessary to remove
unwanted reservists from the recall list while preserving the meaning of the
Honorable Discharge also seems telling; prevention of the Honorable Dis-
charge's "desecration" would appear to be a legitimate military objective.1 0'
Since such activities curtail the reservist's usefulness to the service, the argu-
ment goes, an Honorable Discharge will not accurately reflect the nature of
his military performance.102 But the reservist's active-duty performance may
well have entitled him to an "honorable" release from active duty as did
Olenick's ;lc3 this performance would not be reflected by a less-than-Honorable
discharge. Furthermore, many servicemen suffer from intellectual, emotional,
and physical deficiencies which prevent them from performing effective service
as much as a low security rating; yet they are able and ,permitted to fulfill
military functions consistent with their qualifications. 1 4 Indeed, the Army
99. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858) ; cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 35-36 (1957). See also 1951 Hearings 1082-1104.
100. The active reservist, whose status is beyond the scope of this Note, might be
similarly unaffected by a denial of the military's authority to discipline inactive reservists.
101. See note 98 supra; Hearings on Security and Constitutional Rights 473 (state-
ment of Mr. Jackson, Ass't General Counsel, Dep't of Defense).
102. See id. at 484 (statement of General Counsel Sprague, Dep't of Defense), 436
(February 1955 memorandum to Chief of Staff from Secretary of the Army Stevens);
Hearings on Rehabilitation Bill 2478; Brief for Appellee, p. 23.
103. See text at note 26 supra.
104. [T]here are obviously a great many billets in the military that can be satisfac-
torily filled by strong backs and weak minds, or strong minds and weak backs--or
a combination of both.
Baldwin, Our Fighting Men Have Gone Soft, The Saturday Evening Post, Aug. 8, 1959,
p. 13, at 82. Although the shrinking size of the Army has enabled it to cut down on its
numbers of Group IV men-personnel of the lowest intelligence-nonetheless from July
1954 to September 1958, 16.7% of its enlistees and 30.3% of its inductees were from Group
IV. "Thus the physical and mental qualifications of a large group of the nation's young
men are so low, that, in uniform, they were a handicap rather than a help." Ibid.
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officially concedes that a security risk has not lost all usefulness to the service
by its policy of assigning men on active duty who are of dubious security status
to specially controlled duties. 0 5
Due process alone, however, does not require the Government to select
at its peril a means to a legitimate end which will result in the least possible
injury. All that is required is that the means selected be a reasonable one.
Issuance of a less-than-Honorable discharge to an unsatisfactory reservist
seems a rational method of ridding the service of him while ensuring that the
Honorable Discharge signifies that a man's total (active and reserve) be-
havior was acceptable and, at the same time, deterring inactive reservists from
engaging in proscribed activities. Issuance, therefore, to a man in Olenick's
situation of a less-than-Honorable discharge would seem sufficiently reasonable
to satisfy the fifth amendment.
Even so, the objectives furthered by issuance of a less-than-Honorable dis-
charge to an inactive reservist must be of sufficient import to justify infringe-
ment of his rights of free speech and association. Infringement of these rights,
often judicially labelled "preferred," 05 is tolerated by the courts only under
compelling circumstances and must be confined to the least extent necessary
to effectuate a demonstrably valid purpose. 0 7 When weighing an attempted
limitation upon a first amendment freedom, courts ordinarily ask whether the
gravity of the evil sought to be avoided, discounted by its improbability, justi-
fies the restriction imposed.10 The principal evils contemplated by the Army
are that the suspect individual may allow vital information to fall into the
hands of an enemy by intentional disclosure or inadvertance, that he may
commit acts of espionage, and that he may be generally unreliable on active
duty, particularly in combat. 0 9 Considered in their full scope such threats are
105. As applicable to Olenick, AR 604-10 read in part: "[A]n inductee may be retained
to perform his obligated service in a specially controlled duty under conditions which
would require discharge of an officer or an enlistee... " AR 604-10, para. 3(6) (July 29,
1955), in Brief for Appellant, p. 22. For recent changes in the regulation, see AR 604-10,
parm. 2(d) (May 15, 1957), in 2 LOYALTY MANUAL 31:71.
106. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-
30 (1945) ; Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (concurring opinion) ;
Schneider v. New Jersey, 303 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 450 (1938) ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) ; Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). But see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 526-27,
539 (1951) (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
107. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 303
U.S. 147 (1939) ; Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
108. See First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 419,438, 311 P2d
508, 519 (1957), rezvd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 545 (1958). This standard was orginally
enunciated in Chief Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Dennis, 183 F2d
201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), af'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The Chief Justice's opinion in the
Supreme Court adopted this standard, 341 U.S. at 510 (opinion of Vinson, C.J.). See gen-
erally Gorfinkel & Aack, Dennis v. United States and the Clear md Present Danger Rule,
39 CALiF. L. REv. 475 (1951) ; Cowix, THE CONSTITON AND WHAT IT MEAcs TODAY
263-64 (1958).
109. See AR 604-10, para. 2(a) (May 15, 1957), in 2 LOYALTY MAxuAL 31:71.
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grave. But it is extremely improbable that any inactive reservist, as such, could
thus compromise the national security." 0 The evil must therefore be con-
ditioned on recall to active service, and must be "discounted" by the improb-
ability of recall of any given individual. Further, the Army may be able to
neutralize any such security problem by measures short of separation from
service. AR 604-10, at the time of Olenick's discharge, recommended, for
example, that an inductee whose retention in a security assignment was "not
consistent with the interests of national security" be assigned to specially
controlled duties. Such a recommendation has the merit of isolating the suspect
from security information while allowing him to contribute to the military
effort and to complete his military obligation. Arguably, an additional evil
may exist: so many reservists may join proscribed organizations that an in-
sufficient number will be trustworthy on recall."' Here again the probability
is minimal.
In marked contrast to the relative remoteness of these evils are the severe de-
privations and resulting inhibitions upon free speech and association which
the Undesirable and, to a lesser extent, the General, Discharges impose.
Disabilities attaching to the recipient of a less-than-Honorable discharge have
already been delineated. The magnitude of these restrictions on first amend-
ment liberties is amplified by the Olenick district court's implied validation
of the Secretary's potential but yet unexercised authority to discharge deroga-
torily all inactive reservists for a limitless number of reasons. If such ail
assertion of authority is sustained millions of men presently in the reserves
1.10. For example, information classified Confidential is disseminated to members of
the Army Reserve only when their duties require such information. AR 135-380, para.
4(a) (Aug. 2, 1957). Secret information is disseminated to reservists only when essential
to a course of instruction. AR 135-380, para. 4(b) (Aug. 2, 1957). Information of Top
Secret classification is disseminated only on a "need-to-know" basis for training officers in
certain types of Strategic Intelligence Detachments, and only during active-duty training
periods to officers and enlisted personnel in intelligence reserve units. AR 135-380, para.
4(c) (Aug. 2, 1957).
111. A related fear may be that if the inactive reservist who is a security risk is
awarded an Honorable Discharge, other reservists may feign procommunist associations
to obtain early discharge. This fear is related to the Army's one-time policy as to inductees
who did not satisfactorily complete "loyalty certificate" Dep't of Defense Form 98 (state-
ment that they have not associated with Communists or organizations proscribed by the
Attorney General). To prevent draftees from purposely falsifying Form 98 to escape ser-
vice, the Army inducted persons who seemed to be security-risks, put them in nonsensitive
positions while they were being investigated, then discharged them less-than-honorably if
they were found to be of dubious security status. See Doctor Draft Amendntts Hearings
6, 50, 67 (statements of Secretary of Defense Wilson and Admiral Radford) ; WEINSTEIN,
PERSONNEL SECURTY PROGRAMS OF THE FEDFRAL GOVERNMENT 49-50 (1954). The Army
has recently adopted the policy of postponing induction in cases requiring a security in-
vestigation. See Dep't of Defense Directive 5210.9, para. IX(F), as amended (June 19,




will be subject to military restrictions on their behavior."- To avoid sacrificing
America's genius as a basically "civilian" country, military control of those
in the nation's "citizen army" should be limited -to the least extent necessary
to effectuate overriding military needs." 3 Of the military interests furthered
by less-than-Honorable discharge, only protection of the nation's security
would seem sufficiently grave to justify infringement of first amendment liber-
ties; this interest can be adequately protected by discharge without a deroga-
tory characterization. The dangers which the Army seeks to avoid seem dis-
proportionate to the far-reaching inhibitions imposed by the Secretary's action
on the constitutional rights of free speech and association.
112. As of September 30, 1959, there were 4,589,323 members in reserve components
of all the armed forces; 4,354,173 were not on active duty. U.S. Statistical Services Center,
Dep't of Defense, Release P51.0-R11.0, Reserve Component Strength Summary as of 30
September 1959, Nov. 30, 1959. Reservists not on active duty included 2,492,194 Ready
Reservists and all of the 1,730,635 Standby and 131,344 Retired Reservists. Ibid. As of June
30, 1958, 55.4% of the Ready Reservists not on active duty did not participate in training.
See 1959 Sc'Y DEFENTSE ANN. REP. oN RE~sERVE FoRcEs, chart 2B, at 52. Projecting a
55% rate to the September 30, 1959, figures, approximately 1,370,707 Ready Reservists not
on active duty were not in training as of that date. Approximately 3,232786 reservists not
on active duty therefore do not participate in reserve training programs. Even though some
of the 131,344 Retired Reservists draw substantial pay from the military, see note 3 sufpra,
well over 3,000,000 persons are currently "inactive reservists" under the definition of note
1 supra.
113. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23-41 (1957) ; United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) ; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Vall.) 2 (1866); Duncan
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 325 (1946) (concurring opinion).
19601
